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Abstract
Communication involves a great deal of uncertainty. Prima facie,
it is therefore surprising that biological communication systems – from
cellular to human – exhibit a high degree of ambiguity and often leave
its resolution to contextual cues. This puzzle deepens once we consider
that contextual information may diverge between individuals. In the
following we lay out a model of ambiguous communication in iterated
interactions between subjectively rational agents lacking a common
contextual prior. We argue ambiguity’s justification to lie in endow-
ing interlocutors with means to flexibly adapt language use to each
other and the context of their interaction to serve their communica-
tive preferences. Linguistic alignment is shown to play an important
role in this process; it foments convergence of contextual expectations
and thereby leads to agreeing use and interpretation of ambiguous
messages. We conclude that ambiguity is ecologically rational when
(i) interlocutors’ (beliefs about) contextual expectations are generally
in line or (ii) they interact multiple times in an informative context,
enabling for the alignment of their expectations. In light of these
results meaning multiplicity can be understood as an opportunistic
outcome enabled and shaped by linguistic adaptation and contextual
information.
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1 Meaning multiplicity in communication
In principle, speakers can draw from a large and virtually inexhaustive pool
of alternatives to convey a state of affairs. We can refer to an entity as
Donald Trump, as the forty-fifth president of the United States, or simply
as that guy. Similarly, we may say bank rather than financial institute, bat
rather than baseball club, superfluous hair remover rather than remover of
superfluous hair, or thing instead of any of the aforementioned. When the
primary goal is information transfer, the linguistic choices of speakers are
chiefly constrained by whether their interlocutors will be able to infer this
information as intended. Why and when, then, would a speaker opt for a
more ambiguous expression over one that is less ambiguous?
The diverse nature of these examples illustrates the overall issue to be ad-
dressed: From cellular signals to those employed by meerkats and baboons,
biological signaling is rife with meaning multiplicity (Greenough et al. 1998,
Arnold and Zuberbu¨hler 2006, Santana 2014). Natural languages are no
exception. Prima facie, this fact may be qualified as puzzling, if not as
downright indicative for a lack of communicative efficiency in their design
(Chomsky 2002; 2008). Ambiguity avoidance has an intuitive appeal as the
association of multiple meanings with a single expression can give rise to
uncertainty in interpretation. Consequently, unambiguous languages may
be argued to be better suited for communication. This idea has promi-
nently figured in investigations on the emergence of signaling systems, where
an emerging system is standardly evaluated against the ideal of one-to-one
form-meaning mappings (e.g., Lewis 1969, Steels 1998, Skyrms 2010; see
Spike et al. 2016 for a recent review). Notwithstanding, a number of inves-
tigations have argued for functional advantages of meaning multiplicity. It
allows for smaller vocabularies (Santana 2014), greater signal compression
(Juba et al. 2011), for the reuse of forms that are easier to produce or parse
(Piantadosi et al. 2012, Dautriche 2015, van Rooij and Sevenster 2006), the
partition of large semantic spaces (O’Connor 2015), coordination on non-
lexicalized meaning (Brochhagen 2015), and deception in non-cooperative
communication (Crawford and Sobel 1982). In most of these accounts the
exploitation of contextual information plays a central role. The argument is
simple: The information provided by context needs not be codified in a sig-
nal. As a consequence, ambiguous languages are more compressed or enable
for a more optimal reuse of their inventory than unambiguous counterparts
while transmitting information as faithfully.
A complication ignored by this justification is that the gain attained from
contextual information is not necessarily cashed out in situations in which it
varies across agents. Once a divergence of subjective contextual information
2
is admitted it remains to be shown what the consequences of meaning multi-
plicity are in cooperative communication without imposing a bottleneck on
a language’s inventory size (cf. Crawford and Sobel 1982, O’Connor 2015).
Furthermore, even if the assumption of a common contextual prior were jus-
tified, it is not clear how it may come about nor how it relates to the context
itself. We take up these challenges by analyzing ambiguous communication
in iterated interactions without a common contextual prior. To this end, we
put forward a game theoretic model that couches simple adaptive dynamics
in rational language use (Frank and Goodman 2012, Franke and Ja¨ger 2014),
combining mutual reasoning with pragmatic uncertainty. Our main goal is
twofold. First, we set out to investigate the conditions under which meaning
multiplicity is advantageous by going beyond static approaches and by de-
coupling context from its subjective perception. Second, we seek to further
our understanding of the consequences of linguistic alignment by analyzing
how the interplay of context, subjective contextual expectations and iterated
interactions shapes (un)ambiguous language use.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 lays out our main assumptions together
with the core model we employ to characterize communication under prag-
matic uncertainty. Section 3 showcases the model’s main predictions and
explores the consequences of possible refinements, as well as those that fol-
low from environmental constraints. We critically assess our main findings
and possible shortcomings in section 4 and conclude in section 5.
2 Ambiguous signaling through pragmatic in-
ference
In linguistics it is common to distinguish different types of meaning multiplic-
ity based on syntactic, phonetic, graphemic, or semantic criteria. We take a
decision-theoretic point of view under which the relevant distinction instead
concerns whether or not communicative success hinges on the discrimination
of interpretations associated with the same form. That is, whether an ex-
pression requires its addressee to settle for a particular interpretation over
others – be it simplex or complex, and irrespective of the locus of its mean-
ing multiplicity. While this conception is broad, it excludes notions such as
vagueness, where an expression may have multiple precifications but (at least
partially) successful interpretation does not hinge in teasing them apart (see,
for example, De Jaegher and van Rooij 2011, Franke et al. 2011, O’Connor
2014). For the sake of brevity we will call this property ambiguity, as tacitly
done so far.
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We model language use to the effect that a speaker decides whether to
send an ambiguous message based on her assumptions about her interlocu-
tor’s likely interpretation of it. That is, speakers gauge whether their ad-
dressees will be able to infer the intended meaning from an ambiguous mes-
sage. If not, they may opt for a less ambiguous one to minimize the risk
of misunderstanding. In turn, a hearer’s interpretation will depend on her
subjective expectations in a given context; the relative saliency of interpre-
tations that are truth-conditionally compatible with the message used by
the speaker. We construe such expectations as any source of information
beyond an expression’s literal meaning. These expectations make up an in-
terlocutor’s subjective prior over meanings. Among others, a prior may draw
from the context in which communication takes place, general expectations
of language use, or perceptual information. In short, it represents condensed
information of the association strength with which an interpretation comes
to mind (Franke 2009).
The choice of expressions is further modulated by a speaker’s preferences.
For instance, she may prefer a polite but less clear expression over one that
is more explicit, have particular stylistic predispositions, prefer shorter over
longer expressions, or have preferences over matters such as the relative cog-
nitive load of the retrieval of expressions. We will illustrate our predictions
by assuming a speaker preference for brevity. As argued in the following,
brevity is a plausible candidate for a preference shared across individuals
and additionally has a bearing on domains central to our purpose: linguistic
choice, dialogal adaptation, ambiguity and contextual predictability.
Brevity is often argued to be a rational speaker-oriented principle. It
is posited, for instance, in Grice’s (1975) maxim of manner, Horn’s (1984)
R-principle, and Zipf’s (1949) principle of least effort. The tension between
ambiguity and brevity is explicit in the interaction between Grice’s maxims
of quantity – to be as but not more informative than required – and his
manner (sub)maxims – to be brief but to avoid ambiguity. In dialog, mes-
sage brevity has been reported to increase incrementally in iterated tasks
(Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs 1986, Motamedi et al. 2016, Hawkins et al. 2017).
This provides some indirect evidence for speakers seeking to increase mes-
sage compression when possible. In the case of word length, Piantadosi et al.
(2011) report cross-linguistic evidence for its predictability based on contex-
tual information, a prediction subsequently corroborated by Mahowald et al.
(2013) in a behavioral study suggesting that this relation is a consequence
of deliberate speaker choices (instead of a statistical effect of language use
or word classes). That is, there is some support for the assumption that
brevity interacts with contextual information and influences linguistic be-
havior. Furthermore, there is a wealth of evidence for a negative correlation
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between contextual predictability and the pronunciation length of phones
and words (see Brennan and Hanna 2009:§2.1, Piantadosi et al. 2011, and
references within).
The claim that ambiguity’s risk is assessed through contextual rather
than language internal factors has also received some empirical support (see
Ferreira 2008 and Wasow 2015 for recent psycholinguistic overviews). Two
main findings are relevant here. First, there is little evidence for the idea that
ambiguity influences linguistic behavior to the extent that speakers always
prefer unambiguous expressions over ambiguous ones. This is contrary to the
idea that ambiguity avoidance exerts a strong influence on speakers’ choices,
as phrased in the introduction. Second, while no conclusive evidence for this
kind of avoidance has been found, Ferreira et al. 2005 do report a tendency
for the avoidance of ambiguity in naming tasks in situations in which a dis-
ambiguated reading still applied to multiple objects. For example, subjects
presented with multiple baseball bats of different sizes avoided the plain label
bat to name one of them. The same degree of avoidance was not registered
when the naming target was a baseball bat but a bat of the zoological kind
was also present. A possible rationalization of this difference is that speak-
ers may expect meaning multiplicity rooted in language to be manageable
whereas more information is supplied when context typically would not lend
sufficient support to a single interpretation – as is the case when a label
applies to multiple objects of the same kind. As we argue in the following:
for ambiguity to be advantageous meanings attached to a single form should
generally appear in contrasting contexts to safeguard understanding. That
is, they should appear in contexts in which priors sufficiently favor one inter-
pretation over the other. An expectation that the addressee will be able to
resolve ambiguity may conversely not be warranted when the risk of misun-
derstanding stems from atypical or language external factors. Additionally,
the choice of less ambiguous labels may be fueled by the addressee being
unknown to the speaker, as in Ferreira et al.’s task.
We make three main assumptions drawing from the above. First, speak-
ers have preferences over messages. Second, priors are representations of
subjective a priori meaning saliency. Third, interlocutors engage in mutual
reasoning about rational language use. In particular, speakers reason about
their interlocutors’ contextual expectations in order to gauge whether a mes-
sage will be understood as intended.
Preliminaries. Communication is represented as a signaling game between
two players; a sender and a receiver (Lewis 1969). The sender’s aim is to
communicate a state of affairs s ∈ S by sending a message m ∈M . In turn,
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the receiver’s task is to interpret the message. An interaction’s outcome
accordingly depends on whether the state was conveyed successfully.
A sender’s inclinations over ways of expressing states of affairs is codified
in a cost vector ~c. Cost is inversely related to preference, and ~ci is the cost
of mi. For convenience, we sometimes write c(mi) for the cost of message
i. Subjective expectations in a given context are represented by a prior over
states pr ∈ ∆(S), where prx is player x’s prior. Importantly, players are
uncertain about their interlocutor’s prior. This uncertainty is captured by
a distribution over priors, P ∈ ∆(pr). Put differently, P(pr) represents a
player’s belief about pr being her interlocutor’s prior.
Signaling behavior. Sender and receiver reason about each other to in-
form their linguistic choices. Following previous models of rational language
use this process of mutual reasoning is captured by a hierarchy over reason-
ing types (Frank and Goodman 2012, Franke and Ja¨ger 2014; 2016). The
bottom of the hierarchy, level 0, corresponds to literal signaling behavior.
Literal language users do not reason about their interlocutors but simply
produce/comprehend according to their preferences/expectations and their
language’s semantics. Player x’s literal receiver and sender behavior is given
in (1) and (2).
ρ0(s|m, prx) ∝ L(s,m)prx(s); (1)
σ0(m|s) ∝ L(s,m)− c(m), (2)
where L is a lexicon that maps state-message pairs to the Boolean truth-
value of the message in that state. A minimal lexicon fragment that makes
the choice between ambiguous messages over unambiguous ones precise is
one with three messages and two states, where L(s1,m1) = 1 = L(s2,m2),
L(s1,m3) = 1 = L(s2,m3), and all other state-message pairings are false. Put
into words, in L message m1 is exclusively true of state s1, m2 only of s2,
and m3 is ambiguous between these two states. Speakers of L therefore need
not use ambiguous m3 but may nevertheless choose to do so. Furthermore,
let us assume that m3 is shorter and thereby preferred over m1 and m2;
c(m3) < c(m1) and c(m3) < c(m2). Ambiguous m3 is more risky to use than
either alternative because it is semantically associated with both states. Our
initial question can therefore be recast as asking under which conditions
the risk incurred by the use of preferred m3 undercuts the benefit of safe
unambiguous communication using only m1 and m2.
The tension of a sender wanting to uphold her preferences as much as
possible while taking the, possibly diverging, expectations of her interlocutor
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into consideration arises when higher reasoning types of level n+ 1 are con-
sidered. As in other models of rational language use, these types behave ra-
tionally according to the expected behavior of a level n interlocutor. A more
flexible alternative is for players to have beliefs about their interlocutors’
level of sophistication and for choice probabilities to be derived from these
beliefs (see, e.g., Camerer et al. 2004). The assumption that players believe
their interlocutor to be exactly one level less sophisticated than themselves
is first and foremost made for simplicity, but has also been shown to succeed
in predicting various attested linguistic patterns (see Goodman and Frank
2016 for a recent overview). Ultimately, this issue is empirical. For the time
being we opt for a simpler and to our mind more perspicuous model while
bounding agents’ reasoning to a low degree of sophistication: level 1. This
minimal degree of mutual reasoning suffices to associate m3 with a salient
state under suitable conditions (when the receiver’s prior, respectively, the
sender’s beliefs about it, are informative enough).
Our departure from the standard approach concerns the behavior of the
sender, who, instead of using her own prior to anticipate the receiver’s be-
havior, employs her beliefs about the receiver’s prior P. Letting θ codify
the parameters of pr, the level 1 behavior of player x is then given by:1
ρ1(s|m, prx) ∝ exp(λ σ
0(m|s)prx(s)∑
s′ σ
0(m|s′)prx(s′)); (3)
σ1(m|s,P) ∝ exp(λ((
∫
P(θ)ρ0(s|m, θ)dθ)− c(m))), (4)
where λ is a rationality parameter, λ ≥ 0 (Luce 1959, Sutton and Barto 1998).
As λ increases so does the agents’ tendency to maximize expected utility (see
below for details). For a sender this means that messages judged to have a
high probability of being understood that are of low cost are increasingly
prioritized over low success and/or high cost ones. In the case of receivers,
states true of a message that are favored by their prior are more likely to be
inferred over less expected or false ones.
The behavior of speakers of level 1 given in (4) corresponds to the quantal
best response to a belief-weighted level 0 hearer. The latter is derived from
the domain of P, a set of possible receiver priors, with weights according
to the sender’s belief in them as corresponding to the actual prior of the
1Alternatively, when considering a finite subset of P’s domain:
σ1(m|s,P) ∝ exp(λ((
∑
pr
P(pr)ρ0(s|m, pr))− c(m))).
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hearer. This proposal is conservative in that it retains the predictions made
by previous models of rational language use when the prior is (believed to be)
common. This situation is given when P is degenerate, ruling out all but
the speaker’s own prior. Importantly, it can additionally capture situations
in which the sender is either uncertain about her interlocutor’s expectations,
or is certain but believes that it differs from her own. Such situations can
arise in a number of ways but behaviorally boil down to a speaker’s increased
tendency to use safer messages when uncertain, or to use messages in a way
that might go against her own prior but be in line with her beliefs about
her addressee’s prior, respectively. Reasoning beyond level 1 would allow for
further variability in receiver behavior depending on her beliefs about the
sender’s beliefs, and vice-versa for the sender. However, as noted above, we
do not make use of such additional layers of complexity here.
For illustratory purposes, let us assume that there are only two distribu-
tions in the support of P. For example, pri(s1) = 0.9 = prj(s2). The prior
pri strongly favors state s1 over s2, and vice-versa for prj. Furthermore, let
interlocutors tend to maximize expected utility (high λ), rendering their be-
havior more deterministic, and assume that the lexicon and the cost-induced
order over messages is as above. While there is a gamut of possible speaker
behaviors that arise from an interaction between P and the concrete values
assigned to λ and ~c, there are three general cases of interest. The first is
given by P assigning high probability to pri. In this case, ambiguous m3
is sent in s1 to maximize expected utility. Since the receiver is assumed to
expect s1, m3 is judged to be risky in s2. Consequently, unambiguous m2 is
sent in s2 instead. The second case, in which high probability is assigned to
prj, is the opposite of the first: m3 is sent in s2 but not in s1, where m1 is
sent instead. Lastly, the sender may be uncertain about the receiver’s prior,
reflected, for example, by uniform P. In this case, the speaker will opt for
the safe strategy of sending m1 in s1 and m2 in s2.
Communicative success. After an interaction players receive a payoff de-
pending on whether communication succeeded. The payoffs of sender and re-
ceiver differ as the former incurs some cost depending on the message chosen.
When a sender sendsm in s and a receiver interpretsm as s′, the sender’s pay-
off is uS(s,m, s′) = δ(s, s′)− c(m) and the receiver’s is uR(s,m, s′) = δ(s, s′),
where δ(s, s′) = 1 if s = s′ and otherwise 0. As reflected by δ(·), we restrict
our attention to cooperative communication: Interlocutors strive to under-
stand each other. In particular, senders do not gain from deceiving receivers
through the use of ambiguous messages.
The expected utility of sender x using strategy σ and receiver y using
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strategy ρ is US(x, y) =
∑
s P
∗(s)
∑
m σ(m|s,P)
∑
s′ ρ(s
′|m, pry)uS(s,m, s′)
and UR(x, y) =
∑
s P
∗(s)
∑
m σ(m|s,P)
∑
s′ ρ(s
′|m, pry)uR(s,m, s′), where
P ∗ ∈ ∆(S) is the true distribution over states. The difference between P ∗ and
the players’ subjective expectations, pr ∈ ∆(S), is that the former gives the
true frequency of states and can be thought of as the actual context in which
communication takes place. The latter instead corresponds to subjective
expectations entertained by agents in this context.
Single interactions already allow us to quantify how well a pairing of
signaling strategies fares in a context. However, the degree of their success
chiefly depends on agents’ (beliefs about their interlocutors’) priors, and on
how well these match the context. A crucial component missing from such
an analysis is the possibility of players to interact with each other multiple
times in a given environment. Clearly, if they know nothing about each
other the best a player can do is to make a guess and hope for the best. In
contrast, iterated interactions allow senders to change their beliefs according
to information obtained from receivers’ linguistic behavior, as well as for
subjective expectations over states to adapt to the context itself.
Iterated interactions. More often than not communication involves iter-
ated rather than single interactions. This allows interlocutors to adapt to
each other. In dialog, linguistic alignment is evinced on many levels; from
phonetic (Kim et al. 2011) or syntactic (Pickering and Ferreira 2008) to lex-
ical and referential (Brennan and Clark 1996, Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs 1986,
Hawkins et al. 2017). Here, we are concerned with the relation between
subjective contextual expectations, beliefs about them, and the information
provided by the context in which interactions take place. The latter is codi-
fied in P ∗(·), which interlocutors are indirectly exposed to while they interact.
What is missing, then, are means for priors and beliefs about them to change
over time.
Communication ensues as before. The sender wants to convey a state
and sends a message, the receiver interprets it, and both players receive a
payoff. However, now the players’ own subjective priors and their beliefs
about their interlocutor’s prior are updated based on information gained
from the interaction.
More concretely, we assume priors over states to be updated based on
a player’s accumulated propensity for each state s at interaction t, apt(s).
Accumulated propensity can be likened to a record of the states that the
sender intended to communicate, or the receiver interpreted, in previous
interactions. To this end, the propensity for the state in play is updated by a
value r after an interaction. This value is positive in case of communicative
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success and negative in case of failure. For sender x that sent m in s with
receiver y interpreting this message as s′ this gives:
apxt+1(s) = ap
x
t (s) + f(r), where f(r) = r if δ(s, s
′) = 1,
f(r) = −r otherwise.
The receiver’s accumulated propensity is updated analogously for apyt+1(s
′).
Before interacting, player x’s propensity is simply proportional to her prior,
apx0(si) ∝ prx(si). Subsequently, the prior for interaction t + 1 is derived
from a player’s amassed propensity up to interaction t; prxt+1(si) ∝ apxt (si).
The motivation behind this rather simple learning mechanism is to (ide-
ally) obtain high rationality outcomes from low rationality behavior (Hut-
tegger et al. 2013). Additionally, it allows us to maintain an analogy to simple
biological learning processes (Thorndike 1898, Herrnstein 1970). In human
terms this process is akin to priming in that a state’s saliency increases as in-
terlocutors are exposed to it (Pickering and Garrod 2004, Reitter and Moore
2014).
The value by which propensities change controls how fast the initial prior
is overridden. Small r gives the initial prior more weight whereas larger
values lead players to abandon or reinforce their preconceptions faster. Neg-
ative reinforcement is not required for the iterated convergence of priors but
speeds up the process.2 Note also that r is dissociated from payoff values.
This diverges from most previous signaling models with adaptive learning
dynamics (e.g., Barrett and Zollman 2009, Franke 2015). Notwithstanding,
this assumption is warranted here as there is no reason to relate a speaker’s
prior over states to incurred production cost. In fact, a direct association
of payoffs to updates would have undesirable consequences in cases where
messages true of less frequent states are less costly than those true of more
frequent ones. This would lead to the former being more salient than the
latter. In informal terms: having a preference to talk about something in a
particular fashion should not make it a priori more probable to be spoken
about.
2Other possibilities include the addition of recency effects; by weighting recent states
higher than less recent ones, or learning with suppression; by decreasing the association
strength of states that were not in play (Erev and Roth 1998, Franke and Ja¨ger 2011). Al-
ternatively, interlocutors could use more sophisticated mechanisms to update their priors.
As with our previous choices, we decide for a simple mechanism that serves our purpose.
The contribution of reinforcement learning to our predictions is straightforward and can
be achieved in a number of ways: a player’s expectations of a state should grow with
increased exposure to it.
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In contrast to the somewhat mechanistic fashion in which priors are up-
dated, we assume the change of a sender’s beliefs about her addressee’s prior
to involve an inferential component, here modeled as an update of P that
consolidates old with new information using Bayes’ rule. This reflects the
sender’s primary goal to (actively) reach understanding by correctly antic-
ipating her addressee’s interpretation, a motivation already rooted in the
agents’ engagement in mutual reasoning.
The evidence witnessed by the sender on which she bases her inference
is whether communication succeeded. However, she receives no information
about the receiver’s interpretation if communication failed beyond the fact
that it failed. More precisely, in an interaction in which the speaker wanted
to convey si with message m, interpreted as sk by the receiver, the sender
witnesses w(si), where w(si) = {si} if δ(si, sk) = 1, and otherwise w(si) =
S \ {si}. Based on evidence w(si), the sender adjusts her beliefs about her
interlocutor’s prior based on the likelihood of a prior leading to the witnessed
receiver behavior. Accordingly, P is updated as follows:
Pt+1(pr | w(si),m) ∝ (
∑
s∈w(si)
ρ0(s | m, pr))P t(pr). (5)
When interacting again linguistic choice is computed as before with updated
priors and updated beliefs over them.
3 Predictions for single and iterated interac-
tions
Based on the preceding discussion, a straightforward first prediction is that
ambiguous communication is at least functionally equivalent, in terms of in-
formation transfer and fulfillment of speaker preferences, to unambiguous
counterparts provided that (i) the speaker’s beliefs about the receiver’s prior
correctly anticipate her actual behavior, and that (ii) signaling behavior is
relatively deterministic. Condition (ii) is important to ensure that receivers
have a tendency to associate ambiguous messages with a single state in a
given context. More importantly, under these conditions ambiguity is func-
tionally advantageous when there are at least two contexts in which the true
distribution over states assigns a non-zero probability to distinct states asso-
ciated with a preferred ambiguous message and the speaker uses this message
in both contexts.3 Lastly, ambiguity is maximally advantageous in a context
3For every single context there is an unambiguous lexicon that fares at least as well as
an ambiguous one. For example, one in which m3 is only true of s1 if P
∗(s1) ≥ P ∗(s2),
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if the most frequent state in it is associated with the least costly message
in ~c. Put differently, the most frequent state(s) in a context ought ideally
be associated with the most preferred form(s) when speaker economy is at
stake.
The adoption of an ambiguous strategy ultimately hinges on the sender’s
beliefs about the receiver. Whether the aforementioned advantages manifest
therefore depends on factors that would lead agents to have similar expecta-
tions (over expectations). This also means that ambiguous signaling is more
risky in a world in which contextual expectations greatly vary across agents.
In the case of humans, behavioral experiments suggest that they generally
succeed, at least significantly beyond chance, in matching their expectations
with those of others when it is known that the other party is trying to do the
same (Schelling 1980, Mehta et al. 1994). However, from previous accounts
and our analysis so far, it is unclear how agents may come to entertain such
aligned expectations.
To recapitulate, ambiguity can be advantageous in single interactions as
long as sender beliefs anticipate receiver behavior. Crucially, subjective priors
need not match for ambiguity to be exploited. No common prior is required.
On a general level, this characterization is nevertheless in the spirit of pre-
vious justifications of ambiguity with a shift of the explanatory burden from
a common prior to sufficiently accurate beliefs about the receiver’s prior.
Importantly, this shift highlights that the conditions for safe ambiguity ex-
ploitation may not always be given and allows us to ask when and how they
can be reached. Whether an ambiguous signal is understood depends on the
receiver’s own expectations, whether it is sent depends on the sender’s beliefs
about these expectations, and the expected utility of conveying a particular
state by an ambiguous message will depend on the true distribution over
states. We now turn to iterated communication to tease apart the interac-
tion between these factors and to elucidate how and under which conditions
an advantage crystallizes.
Simulations. In order to illustrate the model’s predictions a sender’s initial
beliefs about the receiver’s prior need to be set. Here, we assume sender
x’s initial P to be Dirichlet distributed, with weights for state s set to
q×prx(s)+1.4 High q corresponds to the sender believing that the receiver’s
expectations are close to her own, with q → ∞ approaching the belief of a
or one in which this message is true only of s2 if P
∗(s1) ≤ P ∗(s2). An advantage for
ambiguity can therefore only manifest when there are multiple contexts. We return to this
matter in §4.
4We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
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Figure 1: Mean subjective prior development in 104 independent simulations
with P *(s1) = 0.7 for r = 0.1 (left) and r = 1 (right).
common prior. Lower values correspond to more divergence and uncertainty.
In the extreme q = 0 leads to complete uncertainty about the receiver’s prior.
Every prior is deemed equally likely.
We use L as above, λ = 20 and ~c = 〈0.4, 0.4, 0.1〉. That is, players are
subjectively rational but might occasionally make mistakes, and ambiguous
m3 is preferred over either unambiguous message, each of equal cost. To
inspect the average outcome of interactions, including best- and worse-case
scenarios, priors are randomly sampled at the onset of a first interaction.
The value of q is sampled from [0; 20] at the onset as well.
The mean development of players’ subjective prior in a context is illus-
trated in Figure 1 for two values of reinforcement parameter r. This figure
shows that priors approach the true distribution of the context as players
interact in it. When there are only two states this simple learning process
is particularly fast because negative reinforcement in one state leads to the
prominence of the other. Figure 1 also showcases the role of r in controlling
the speed by which priors converge to a context’s distribution.
In the following we focus on results obtained from an r-value of 0.5 after
50 interactions. The latter ensures that the reported outcomes approximate
endpoints of the dynamics but should not be taken as indicative of the min-
imal number of interactions required to reach them. Supplementary results
obtained from less interactions and different r-values are provided in Ap-
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pendix A.
A more central interaction is that between P ∗ and a sender’s beliefs about
her interlocutor’s prior, as well as their bearing on the choice of an ambigu-
ous message. Figure 2 showcases how the context influences sender beliefs.
Recall thatP is updated based on what can be inferred about the receiver’s
prior from her behavior. The only interactions that are informative about
this matter, and therefore influence a sender’s beliefs, are the receiver’s inter-
pretations of ambiguous messages. In turn, the receiver’s interpretation of an
ambiguous message may change over time due to her exposure to the context
(cf. Figure 1). In particular, contexts that are not very informative can lead
to fluctuations in the receiver’s expectations, making them more difficult to
predict for the sender. Consequently, as showcased by the left plot in Fig-
ure 2, senders grow uncertain about their interlocutor’s expectations in such
uninformative contexts. The uninformative prior that receivers converge to
in such contexts does not lend itself for the safe exploitation of ambiguity
either. Uncertainty about expectations centered around uninformative priors
therefore often lead to the avoidance of risky signals. By contrast, receiver
expectations in informative contexts are fairly predictable after a few inter-
actions, a fact senders pick up on once they employ an ambiguous signal.
As shown for P ∗(s1) = 0.9 in Figure 2, senders tend to overestimate their
interlocutor’s prior in informative contexts. This is due to the likelihood of
a correct interpretation of m3 being higher the more degenerate subjective
priors are. Overestimation decreases as mutual reasoning levels increase but
predictions about the use or avoidance of ambiguous messages do not hinge
on the shape of the sender’s belief but on the range of priors it concentrates
on. That is, a false belief about an addressee’s prior is not detrimental to
communication if it correctly predicts behavior.
The amount of senders that adopt an ambiguous strategy in a context
is reflected most clearly by their expected utility. An excerpt of the mean
expected sender utility together with the mean Jensen-Shannon divergence
(JSD) between the interlocutors’ priors is given in Table 1.5 Note first that
even in a non-informative context the mean expected utility of senders is
higher than 0.6, the value guaranteed by the use of only unambiguous mes-
sages m1 and m2. It is also higher than the mean utility of approximately
0.57 expected in the first interaction. The latter value is lower than the safe
guaranteed value of 0.6 because priors and q were sampled randomly, in-
evitably leading to the failure of some initial attempts to exploit ambiguous
5Informally, JSD measures the closeness of two distributions as a divergence to
their average. More precisely, JSD(pri, prj) = 1/2D(pri||M) + 1/2D(prj ||M), where
M = 1/2(pri + prj) and D(P ||Q) =
∑
s P (s) log
P (s)/Q(s).
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Figure 2: Mean beliefs about receiver expectations in 104 independent sim-
ulations with P *(s1) = 0.5 (left) and P
*(s1) = 0.9 (right).
P ∗(s1) US (σ) JSD USmax
0.5 .61 (.06) .004 .75
0.7 .68 (.10) .002 .81
0.9 .72 (.13) .002 .87
Table 1: Mean sender expected utility and JSD of interlocutors’ priors af-
ter 50 iterations in 104 independent games. Umax indicates the maximum
expected utility reachable for a given P *.
m3. As suggested by Figure 1, iterated interactions also strongly improve
upon the mean initial JSD of approximately 0.15. Lastly, the increase in the
standard deviation of expected utility with the informativity of a context is
a consequence of the increasing difference between the utility gained from an
ambiguous signaling strategy against that of adopting an unambiguous one.
In sum, these results (i) generalize past analyzes of ambiguity by relax-
ing the assumption of a common prior, (ii) show how agents may come to
entertain (beliefs about) contextual expectations that allow for the safe ex-
ploitation of ambiguity, (iii) highlight the role of context informativity in
enabling or preventing such exploitation, and (iv) connect this research with
claims in the alignment literature about its role in dialog optimization, pro-
viding interlocutors with means to establish patterns of language use better
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tailored to the context of their interaction and their preferences (Clark and
Wilkes-Gibbs 1986, Reitter and Moore 2014). More broadly, this interac-
tive perspective also highlights the function of ambiguity as an opportunistic
adaptive device that endows agents with the ability to mold language use
to their interlocutors and the environment, and links this opportunism to
the information provided by a context. Contexts of high informativity are
particularly conducive to ambiguity exploitation because they (i) foment less
fluctuations in the receiver’s interpretation of ambiguous messages and, con-
sequently, (ii) lead to less uncertainty in the sender’s beliefs about her inter-
locutor’s prior. The expected utility of senders also increases with context
informativity as these contexts more often lead to the association of fre-
quent states with preferred but ambiguous messages. This association is not
explicitly sought after by senders but rather is a byproduct of a receiver’s
association of an ambiguous message with its most salient interpretation.
The interplay of saliency, frequency and interpretation therefore often leads
players to adopt Pareto optimal signaling strategies.
Notwithstanding, as shown in Table 1, not even informative contexts
guarantee that an ambiguous strategy is always adopted. There are two
intertwined reasons for this. First, we allowed the priors of interlocutors to
vary freely before engaging in communication. This may cause a speaker with
an uninformative prior and high q to believe her interlocutor’s prior to be
uninformative as well. Consequently, such a speaker will never try to use an
ambiguous message even after exploring the context (which may turn out to
be informative). Similarly, initial uncertainty from low q may lead speakers
to not use risky signals, meaning that they never learn anything about the
receiver’s expectations. Second, a great number of interactions started with
opposing contextual expectations. This can lead to an early communicative
failure when using an ambiguous message. As in the other cases mentioned,
this can then deter the sender from using risky messages in the future. We
briefly explore two assumptions that can address these issues.
3.1 Exploration and past experience
Communication draws from past experience and agents may often find them-
selves in similar contexts. This enables visitors of zoos and baseball courts
alike to use plain bat without first probing whether their interlocutor is at-
tentive to the same meaning. They have experience in these contexts and
assume that their interlocutors have had some too. At least to a degree to
which one interpretation of ambiguous bat is markedly more expected than
the other. Once we allow for richer background knowledge of a context, ei-
ther by taking into consideration previous interactions with other agents or
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non-linguistic exposure to it, the issue of strongly diverging initial priors is
reduced. A shared cultural background and experience in an environment
may therefore suggest themselves as partial answers to the question how lin-
guistic coordination with ambiguous messages can succeed prior to multiple
interactions.6
The question how the speaker’s initial confidence q is determined remains,
however. While a detailed treatment is outside the scope of this investigation,
one possibility is for it to be sensitive to the informativity of a context in
combination with beliefs about the receiver’s experience in similar contexts.
In broad strokes: High q may come about because the context is assumed
to be well known. Either because this is known about the receiver itself
or because this context is common enough that members of a population
are taken to be familiar with it. An informative context that is assumed
to have been encountered frequently enough may then lead to an optimistic
speaker strategy in which ambiguity is believed to be (usually) resolvable (cf.
Clark and Schober’s (1992) presumption of interpretability). Even for such
optimistic speakers adaptive dynamics would still play a role in unknown or
infrequent contexts, as well as as corrective devices when optimism turns out
to be misplaced.
3.2 Preemptive adaptation
Next, we turn to the issue of senders who, due to early communicative failure
or initial uncertainty about their interlocutors’ expectations, remain averse
to ambiguity even in informative contexts. The reason for senders occa-
sionally “locking-in” on an unambiguous strategy even if they could safely
exploit ambiguity is that the update ofP is not sensitive to the information
gained from the context. Nor to the fact that interlocutors adapt to it over
time. There are different alternatives that can stimulate the exploration of
ambiguous strategies after learning more about the context. A simple one is
for P(pr) to be affected by the probability of the current state si under pr:
Pt+1(pr | w(si),m, si) ∝ (
∑
s∈w(si)
ρn−1(s | m, pr))P t(pr)pr(si). (6)
This operationalizes a sender that changes her beliefs on the assumption
that her interlocutor adapts to the context – “preemptively” exploiting the
6There are many ways in which this idea could be implemented. For example, initial
priors could be derived from samples of P ∗, or from past interactions with other agents.
We chose not to do so as we hope the positive effect this idea would have are clear.
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P ∗(s1) US (σ) JSD USmax
0.5 .58 (.114) .033 .75
0.7 .8 (.022) .001 .81
0.9 .87 (0) 0 .87
Table 2: Mean sender expected utility and JSD of interlocutors’ priors after
50 iterations in 104 independent games using “preemptive” belief updates.
Umax indicates the maximum expected utility reachable for a given P
*.
relative saliency of states that were relevant before. Table 2 shows how
this inference mechanism affects the outcome of interactions. As with the
previous update rule, supplementary results obtained from less interactions
and different r-values are provided in Appendix A.
In a nutshell, this less conservative update fares well in informative con-
texts but less so in uninformative ones. In informative contexts the propor-
tion of dyads that adopt the Pareto optimal strategy of associating m3 with
the most frequent state is markedly higher than under the simpler update
mechanism in (5). However, as shown for P ∗(s1) = 0.5, this can come at a
cost in less informative contexts. The modified update in (6) favors priors
that are informative about the current state in play. Consequently, while the
receiver converges to a prior that is not well-suited for ambiguity exploita-
tion in such contexts, speakers instead tend to infer more informative priors,
attempt the use of risky signals, and often fail. By contrast, our main pro-
posal for updating P leads to more cautious behavior that may not always
result in ambiguity exploitation but generally ensures that communication
succeeds.
4 Discussion
We proposed a conservative generalization of models of rational language use
and combined it with simple adaptive dynamics to generate predictions about
ambiguous communication between players lacking a common prior. The
model decouples interlocutors’ subjective contextual expectations from each
other, as well as from the environment itself. This weakens the assumptions
of past investigations by neither assuming a common prior (Piantadosi et al.
2012, Santana 2014) nor shared randomness in a language’s forms (Juba et al.
2011). Beyond their separation, these components were argued to iteratively
feed into each other. A sender’s beliefs about her interlocutor play a central
role in her linguistic behavior and change according to the receiver’s actions.
At the same time, interlocutors’ communicative intentions and expectations
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are indirectly shaped by the environment and the outcome of interactions.
In single interactions ambiguity is predicted to be advantageous when
(beliefs about) priors are sufficiently aligned relative to the truth-conditions
of a language (cf. Juba et al. 2011, Piantadosi et al. 2011, Santana 2014).
We further showed that these conditions can often be reached when iterated
interactions and adaptive mechanisms are considered. Even if players’ priors
are allowed to initially vary freely. In a nutshell, the more speakers interact,
the closer their (beliefs about) contextual expectations grow, and the riskier
their communication can be. Crucially, whether (beliefs about) expectations
facilitate the safe exploitation of ambiguity is influenced by how informative
the context of interaction is. More informative contexts allow interlocutors
to reach an implicit agreement on salient meanings faster and more reliably
than less informative ones. A byproduct of this interaction is the association
of preferred forms with frequent meanings.
The model also establishes a connection between models of rational lan-
guage use, usually confined to single interactions, and linguistic alignment. In
analogy to experimental findings with human subjects, it predicts increased
signal compression as interlocutors interact (Fowler and Housum 1987, Clark
and Wilkes-Gibbs 1986, Bard et al. 2000, Motamedi et al. 2016, Kim et al.
2011, Pickering and Ferreira 2008, Brennan and Clark 1996, Hawkins et al.
2017), a strong connection between linguistic adaptation and task success
(Fusaroli et al. 2012), and audience and interaction dependent adaptation
(Branigan et al. 2010, Garrod and Doherty 1994, Brennan and Clark 1996,
Metzing and Brennan 2003). These parallels should however not be taken to
suggest the model to be a comprehensive model of dialog adaptation. Our
main aim was to add to the general understanding of the conditions under
which ambiguity may be justified in cooperative communication, as well as
how these conditions can be reached and how they interact. The model is
therefore best viewed as an informed but idealized abstraction of communi-
cation. It is at this level that it makes predictions about ambiguous com-
munication under the assumption that interlocutors (i) have preferences over
messages, (ii) engage in mutual reasoning, (iii) are influenced by information
acquired from (iiia) context and (iiib) their interlocutor, and that they (iv)
have private contextual expectations. The specifics of these assumptions de-
pend on the situation at hand. For instance, interactions in which linguistic
feedback from addressees is limited – such as speeches, lectures or meetings
– may require higher degrees of reasoning. Particularly from addressees. On
the other extreme, other cases of biological signaling may often involve less
rather than more sophistication. In particular, assumptions (ii) and (iiib)
may seem contentious when applied to communication of non-human organ-
isms. Along the lines of our and previous accounts, whether ambiguity is jus-
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tified in such cases instead depends on whether priors are generally aligned,
dissipating the need for mutual reasoning. An important contributing fac-
tor to successful ambiguous communication without conditions (ii) and (iiib)
may be that other organisms have been argued to lack or only show very lim-
ited degrees of displacement, the ability to communicate about things that
are not spatio-temporally present (Hockett 1960). By contrast, in the case of
human communication, nothing prevents two zoologists at a baseball court
to discuss their work on bats. In sum, we laid out a general model of rational
language use and analyzed its predictions under assumptions that draw from
insights of previous research. However, we make no claim to have exhausted
the diverse conditions under which biological signaling takes place.
The complementary approach to dialogal adaptation recently proposed
by Hawkins et al. (2017) deserves some mention. Rather than starting with
fixed semantics, Hawkins et al. analyze adaptation in convention formation,
when states are yet to be lexically associated with particular forms. Their
dynamics consequently initialize with interlocutors that are uncertain about
the meaning of messages. That is, interlocutors have uncertainty about their
interlocutor’s lexicon L(·,m) (Bergen et al. 2016) rather than about her prior.
Over interactions, evidence for the use of a particular lexicon then leads to
the mutual adoption of (unambiguous) semantics in a self-reinforcing pro-
cess initially driven by chance. There are clear parallels and differences to
our proposal. As for parallels, in both cases uncertainty diminishes over in-
teractions and is leveraged to effect agreement on disambiguated language
use. As for differences, our prior-driven disambiguation process presupposed
fixed semantics. In fact, ambiguous semantics that can be resolved differently
across contexts are central to our justification, as well as the starting point
of this investigation. By contrast, lexical uncertainty leads to the emergence
of unambiguous semantics starting from no preexisting conventions (Skyrms
2010, Spike et al. 2016). Lexical and pragmatic uncertainty can therefore
be regarded as dual processes whose explanatory role depends on the degree
to which semantics are (believed to be) shared. On the one hand, novel
situations may be require interlocutors to establish what expressions mean.
On the other hand, interactions that build on established conventions may
instead draw communicative advantage from what expressions can convey in
a context. We think the rich spectrum of situations where a combination of
lexical and pragmatic uncertainty may come into play, as well as a formal
and conceptual analysis of their role at the semantics-pragmatics interface
offers exciting venues for future research.
One way in which the model can be criticized is that players accurately
recognize the context they are in and that they approximate subjectively ra-
tional behavior (albeit bounded in mutual reasoning depth and allowing for
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occasional mistakes). These simplifying assumptions do not have a strong
bearing on our main argument; a weakening of either is tantamount to the
introduction of a higher error rate when using ambiguous signals. It follows
that if this rate exceeds the benefit of the use of preferred but ambiguous
messages, then unambiguous communication is predicted to be more advanta-
geous and consequently to be adopted. This is well in line with our argument
that the benefit of meaning multiplicity is enabled by particular conditions
rather than being a property that benefits language users across the board.
This investigation focused on analyzing the conditions under which am-
biguous signals can be used without incurring communicative disadvantages
in a single context. As noted earlier, one may therefore contend that for
any given context an unambiguous language that semantically associates the
most frequent state with the most preferred message can be constructed. We
agree. Were the world such that language users would always find themselves
in exactly the same context there would be little use to associating multiple
meanings to a single form because contextual information would be invariant.
In such a case speakers would do better if they avoided the risk of ambiguous
communication altogether and opted for unambiguous expressions instead. It
should therefore be stressed that the advantage of expressions that are true
of more than one state lies in their ability to fulfill speaker preferences in
multiple contexts simultaneously. This is something unambiguous language
can not do. Unambiguous alternatives are nevertheless important. At least
for communication that allows for displacement. They come into play either
when speakers need to signal a state that is not in line with (beliefs about)
contextual expectations, or when these are not sufficiently informative.
To summarize, ambiguity endows agents with the ability to adapt their
linguistic resources to an environment without incurring too great a risk of
misunderstanding. This may involve an adaptation process between inter-
locutors in a particular situation, but can also draw from general knowledge
about commonly experienced domains in single interactions. The more var-
ied the world but more shared the experience, the better ambiguous language
users fare. These results add to the growing list of realms in which ambigu-
ity has been argued to be justified, such as non-cooperative communication
(Crawford and Sobel 1982), unaligned preferences (De Jaegher and van Rooij
2014), and when a language’s form inventory is restricted in size (O’Connor
2015).
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5 Conclusion
We argued that the risk of ambiguity lies not in the meaning multiplicity
of expressions but rather in uncertainty about contextual expectations. In
turn, its advantage lies in the reuse of preferred forms, leaving coordination
on meaning to be partially resolved by the context of interaction. We have
shown under which conditions this justification holds without a common con-
textual prior and characterized how language users may come to successfully
communicate even when these conditions are initially not given, as well as
when they fail to materialize. Linguistic alignment was shown to play a piv-
otal role in this process by having a bearing on coordination and convergence
of (beliefs about) expectations over meaning, and thereby influencing linguis-
tic choice. In more general terms, we argued that meaning multiplicity is an
adaptive tool that enables agents to fit language to their needs, their inter-
locutors, and the environment, through an exploitation of shared pragmatic
principles and (partially) shared contextual information.
Ambiguity is not inevitable. However, when the conditions for its ex-
ploitation are given it is likely to emerge through interaction. In func-
tional terms our analysis echoes the sentiment already expressed by Miller
(1951:111). Ambiguity is not the unruly creature it often is branded to be.
Instead, its qualification as disruptive or suboptimal is an artifact of theo-
retical idealization – a product of expressions’ isolated inspection instead of
in the naturally richer contexts they are produced.
A Supplementary results
The following tables supplement the simulation results reported in §3. All
outcomes correspond to a mean of 104 independent simulations with λ = 20
and ~c = 〈0.4, 0.4, 0.1〉. The results in Table 3 were obtained from the simple
update mechanism of P presented in §2, in (5), and those in Table 4 from
its “preemptive” refinement in §3, in (6).
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